

Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /011 R

666616

DRAFTED BY EA/INS:JMDION

APPROVED BY EA/IMS:EDWARD C. INGRAHAM

S/S-O:JHOGANSON

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R 040018Z APR 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

S E C R E T STATE 076225

EXDIS FOR GENERAL BROWN

FOLLOWING REPEAT JAKARTA 3762 ACTION SECSTATE INFO SAIGON

TEHRAN DATED 31 MAR 75

QUOTE

S E C R E T JAKARTA 3762

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR MILI ID VS

SUBJ: INDONESIA AND ICCS

REF: A. STATE 071694 B. JAKARTA 3691 C. JAKARTA 3729

1. SUMMARY: IN MEETING MARCH 31, FONDEPT DIRGEN FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS DJAJADININGRAT CONFIRMED GOI, UNDER
PRESSURE FRM MILITARY, GIVING SERIOUS THOUGHT TO WITH-
DRAWING FROM ICCS IN VIEW CHANGING POLITCAL REALITIES
IN AREA AND DOUBTS THAT GVN CAN WITHSTAND CURRENT COM-
MUNIST OFFENSIVE. DJAJADININGRAT, NOTING HE (AND
IMPLIEDLY MALIK) CAN SEE RATIONALE FOR CONTINUING INDONESIAN
PARTICIPATION, STATED PRECIPITOUS FINAL DECISION UNLIKELY,
ADDING THAT US REACTION TO CRISIS, OUR ASSESSMENT OF
GVN PROSPECTS, AND DEVELOPING SITUATION IN VIETNAM WILL

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ALL INFLUENCE GOI DECISION. END SKMMARY

2. IN MEETING EARLY MARCH 31, FONDEPT DIRGEN FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS DJAJADININGRAT, WHO HAD INVITED ME IN, OPENED BY STATING HE SURE I KNEW SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION, AND ASKED FOR US ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN VIETNAM. I REPLIED THAT, FROM MEETING WITH DEFENSE SECURITY CHIEF MAJGEN MURDANI(REF B), I KNEW GOI REVIEWING ENTIRE VIETNAM SITUATION, INCLUDING PARTICPATION IN ICCS, DRAWING FROM MEMORANDUM (WHICH I LEFT WITH DJAJADINGRAT)BASED ON POINTS MADE REF A, I OUTLINED IN SOME DETAIL REASONS US HOPES THAT INDONESIA WILL REMAIN IN ICCS. I PARTICULARLY STRESSED ADVERSE REACTION IN VIETNAM, US AND ELSEWHERE IF NON-COMMUNIST INDONESIA WERE TO DEAL SERIOUS BLOW TO PARIS ACCORDS AND URGED THAT INDONESIA RETIAN AT LEAST A NUCLEUS ICCS CONTINGENT IN SAIGON. I ALSO NOTED THAT, FROM ALL INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO ME, IT APPEARS NORTH VIETNAM NOT YET SEEKING TOTAL MILITARY VICTORY BUT RATHER HOPING TO INCREASE ITS BARGAINING POSITION IN NEW ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. FOR THIS REASON INDONESIA'S WITHDRAWL WOULD BE DOUBLY UNFORTUNATE. LEGAL STRUCTURE FOR ANY RESUMPTION NEGOTIATIONS RAMINS PARIS AGREEMENTS IN ALL ASPECTS.

3. DJAJADININGRAT STATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD VERY WELL ARGUMENTS I WAS MAKING AND THAT HE (AND IMPLIEDLY FONMIN MALIK) COULD SEE NEED FOR CONTINUING INDONESIAN PARTICIPATION IN ICCS. HOWEVER, THEY WERE FACED WITH COUNTERING FEELING ON PART OF INDNESIAN MILITARY THAT GVN UNABLE CONTAIN COMMUNIST MILITARY AGGRESSION (NOTE REF C) AND THAT US WITHDRAWING FROM SCENE. IN THIS CONNCTION HE ASKED SPECIFICALLY IF (A) US LIKELY TO SEND TROOPS TO VIETNAM; I REPLIED THIS IS FORBIDDEN BY LAW; (B) IF US LIKELY TO RESUME BOMBING; I REPLIED THIS UNLIKELY UNLESS PICTURES OF FLIGHT FROM DANANG WERE DRASTICALLY TO CHANGE US PUBLIC OPINION; AND (C) IF US LIKELY TO PROVIDE MORE MILITARY ASSISTANCE; I REPLIED ADMINISTATION IS SEEKING SUCH ASSISTANCE AND PROSPECTS NOT ENTIRELY UNFAVORABLE. DJADININGRAT NOTED THAT, IN OPINION OF INDONESIAN MILITARY, US MILITARY ASSISTANCE ALONE WILL NOT SUFFICE, ADDING THAT FONDEPT IS CONCERNED OVER REPORTS

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OF ARRESTS OF THIEU OPPONENTS AT TIME GVN SHOULD BE SEEKING WIDEST BACKING.

4. DJAJADININGRAT ASKED FOR OUR APPRAISAL OF SITUATION IN VIETNAM AND GVN PROSPECTS. I RELIED THAT WE HAD REQUESTED SUCH AN APPRAISAL ANDWOULD PASS IT ON WHEN RECEIVED. DJADININGRAT STATED THAT GOI DECISION WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY THIS APPRAISAL, BY US REACTION TO

SITUATION AS EVIDENCED BY INCREASED SUPPORT FOR GVN THROUGH MILITARY ASSISTNCE OR DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES, AND BY DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM ITSELF.

5. I NOTED THAT WE HAD HEARD REPORTS GOI MIGHT MAKE DECISION BEFORE PRESIDENT SUHARTO'S TRIP TO AUSTRALIA APRIL 3. SINCE INDONESIAN PARTICIPATION IN ICCS HAD ORIGINATED IN DISCUSSION BETWEEN SUHARTO AND SECRETARY KISSINGER I WOULD HOPE THAT, BEFORE ANY FINAL DECISIONS WERE MADE, WE MIGHT HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW QUESTION WITH PRESIDENT. IN THIS CONNECTION, I NOTED THAT I WOULD BE ACCOMPANYING CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS GENERAL BROWN ON HIS CALL ON SUHARTO (TENTATIVELY SET FOR APRIL 7). I ALSO URGED THAT INDONESIA WORK WITH IRAN ON ICCS FUTURE INCLUDING ANY APPROACH TO SGNATORY POWERS OF PARIS ACCORDS.

6. DJAJADINGRAT REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT FORESEE A PRECIPITOUS DECISION TO WITHDRAW. IN RESPONSE MY QUESTION ABOUT CONSULTATION WITH IRAN, DJADINGRAT NOTED HE HAD CALLED IN IRANIAN AMBASSADOR SHOKOUHIAN EARLIER IN MORING BUT "THAT MAN" QUITE UNINFORMED ON ICCS MATTERS AND NEEDED TO REFER QUESTION TO TEHRAN.

7. COMMENT: PICTURE PAINTED BY DJAJADININGRAT VERY SIMILAR TO THAT RECEIVED DURING MARCH 29 MEETING WITH MURDANI(REF C) ALTHOUGH SUGGESTS DECISION LESS IMMINENT AND THAT FONDEPT IS APPARENTL STILL ARGUING FOR CONTINUED INDONESIAN PARTICIPATION. IF SITUATION IN VIETNAM STABILIZES AND GVN ABLE TO DRAW LINES IT CAN DEFEND, THERE SOME CHANCE OF FONDEPT'S VOICE PREVAILING. HOWEVER, IF SITUATION DETERIORATES STEADILY, UPON HIS RETURN TO INDONESIA APRIL 5 SUHARTO WILL BE FACED WITH EVEN STRONGER
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VOICES URGING HE PULL OUT OF ICCS FOR MILITARY AND POLITICAL REASONS.

8. OPPORTUNITY PROBABLY STILL EXISTS FOR FURTHER ARGUMENTATION IF DEPARTMENT WISHES MAKE SUGGESTIONS. ASSUME DEPARTMENT WILL INSURE GENERAL BROWN BRIEFED FULLY ON THIS SITUATION. NEWSOM
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: WITHDRAWAL OF MEMBERSHIP
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 04 APR 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: buchantr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE076225
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: JMDION
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750116-1140
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750480/aaaacvcf.tel
Line Count: 163
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 75 STATE 071694, 75 JAKARTA 3691, 75 JAKARTA 3729
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: buchantr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 13 MAY 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <13 MAY 2003 by izenbei0>; APPROVED <01 OCT 2003 by buchantr>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: INDONESIA AND ICCS
TAGS: PFOR, MILI, ID, VS, US, ICCS
To: ISLAMABAD
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006